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incorporating rural-urban migration, human capital externalities, and regional 
agglomeration effects into Galor and Zeira’s (1993) overlapping generations model to 
examine the welfare impacts of various person-based and place-based policies. We 
formalize the conditions that may induce a rural brain-drain. The model is calibrated and 
simulated to demonstrate how regions with different production and housing technologies 
may respond differently to a given policy. Our results show that for certain parameter 
values, well intended policies targeting poor households may instead worsen their long-
run welfare outcomes if households prefer not to migrate to the wealthier urban region 
when awarded an education subsidy. In other cases, person-based policies are shown to 
improve the long-run welfare of poorer households by facilitating migration to the city. 
Place-based policies that enhance rural firm productivity without targeting individual 
households may yield higher average welfare for rural residents. In some instances, the 
benefits of place-based policies may not trickle down to less wealthier households, 
whereas in other cases, they are more effective than the subsidy program in improving 
the welfare of the poorest. 
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Introduction 
In addition to estimating the immediate welfare impacts of policy designed to reduce 
rural poverty, it is important to assess changes in the dynamics of welfare resulting from 
its implementation. Arguably, some of the greatest gains to society of  such policies are 
realized through benefits that accrue through intergenerational linkages (Partridge and 
Rickman, 2006). Revised estimates of intergenerational income elasticities in the US 
reveal that mobility between income classes may be lower than previously assumed 
(Solon, 1992; Mazumdar, 2005; Charles and Hurst, 2003). This implies that financial 
constraints faced by a child’s family may have serious repercussions to his/her earnings 
capacity as an adult. Effective policy may stem the persistence of poverty by translating 
current gains to future generations that may also be self-reinforcing over time.   
The further a rural town is situated from its nearest urban core, the more it is penalized in 
terms of poverty rates (Partridge and Rickman, 2008). Policies designed to improve local 
labor market conditions or raise educational attainment levels will shift labor demand and 
supply. Moreover, these policies contribute to welfare differentials between regions, and, 
since people vote with their feet, may spur migration out of the rural region. The 
redistribution of human capital leads to further adjustments in wages, which, through 
intergenerational linkages, alters future local labor supply as well. Yet, these adjustments 
may have particularly adverse consequences on the remaining residents of rural areas if 
the migration leads to a ‘brain drain’ that reduces the productivity of the remaining 
workers. Thus, migration and informational spillovers between regions thereby create a 
nexus between the spatial distribution of economic activity and the evolution of regional 
welfare over time. 
Whether a person-based policy is more effective than a place based policy in alleviating 
poverty depends, to a great extent, on the region’s characteristics. Every place has unique 
characteristics that preclude spatially uniform responses to a given policy. The current 
debate between person and place bases policies illustrates that both types of policies have 
their merits as well as drawbacks. Person based policies, such as education subsidies 
direct benefits to those that are disadvantaged but may be very expensive and induce 
migration of the most able workers if there aren’t sufficient employment opportunities 
locally (Blank, 2005; Partridge and Rickman, 2006), thereby undermining a possible 
rationale for their implementation. Place-based policies have the advantage of improving 
the economic vitality of the region and increasing job opportunities but the benefits may 
not be captured by poorest (Kraybill and Kilkenny, 2003; Partridge and Rickman, 2006). 
This paper demonstrates how the interaction between a rural region and a vibrant city 
affects the evolution of welfare over time. We extend Galor and Zeira’s (1993) 
overlapping generations model to examine how various centripetal and centrifugal forces 
spur or deter rural-to-urban migration of skilled workers. Higher regional wages serve as 
a centripetal force, attracting workers into the region, whereas higher housing prices and 
congestion serve as a centrifugal force. The model focuses on the mechanism by which 
migration affects the intergenerational transmission of wealth in the rural region. We 
simulate the model under different initial conditions for housing and goods production 
technologies and observe how person-based policies fare verses place-based policies in 
reducing poverty and improving welfare.    4
The Model 
Previous migration models in the economic geography literature have stressed 
Marshallian externalities and agglomeration economies with homogenous households and 
a fixed number of skilled workers (Fujita and Thisse, 2002 and Helpman, 1998). 
Conversely, this model assumes barriers to migration, an unequal distribution of wealth, 
credit constraints, and fixed costs of human capital accumulation, thereby endogenizing 
investments in skill formation. The decision of households to invest in human capital and 
migrate will depend on the wealth inherited from their forefathers, which in turn, 
determines the return to investment and migration for subsequent generations.  
The indivisibility of human capital investments and credit constraints causes 
nonlinearities in the intergenerational dynamics of wealth, generating multiple steady 
states. The unstable steady state, a counterpart of the Micawber threshold in the asset 
dynamics literature (Carter and Barrett, 2006), is the level of wealth above which families 
gravitate towards a higher level of welfare, and below which they spiral down into a 
poverty trap. Allowing for migration between regions, though at a cost, shifts these 
steady states by magnitudes depending on the change in rural and urban labor 
productivity. If diminishing returns to skilled labor are strong and outweigh the effect of 
knowledge spillovers, then the outflow of skilled workers from the rural region may  lead 
to a rise in wages and a net welfare increase for the remaining residents. On the other 
hand migration can produce vicious cycles if wages in the region experiencing the brain 
drain decrease because there are fewer complementary skilled workers. These dynamics 
may give skilled workers even less of an incentive to stay, leading to further reduction in 
wages due to the depletion of the stock of human capital. 
To put this theory in perspective, Baumann and Reagan (2005)  find that the probability 
of college graduates migrating out of the Appalachian region, which has some of the 
highest poverty rates in the United States, is 17%, while the probability for non-
Appalachian college graduates migrating into the region is only 1.2%. The gap in the 
return to education between Appalachia and the rest of the country increases with 
education, therefore, college graduates face a higher opportunity cost of staying than low-
skilled workers who prefer the lower costs of living in Appalachia. The incentive for 
college students to migrate is compounded by Appalachia’s close proximity to several 
growing urban areas such as Atlanta, Nashville, and Washington, D.C. that provide 
economic opportunities at relatively low migration and psychic costs (Baumann and 
Reagan, 2005). The out-migration of skilled workers likely facilitates the persistence of 
poverty in the region. The following model formalizes the impact of migration on welfare 
outcomes and provides a framework to predict under which conditions the source region 
will benefit from migration or adversely, experience a brain drain, as that experienced by 
Appalachia and other poor regions of the world. 
 
The Framework 
In every generation, households live for two periods and allocate their wealth between 
bequests to their children and the consumption of housing and a homogenous good. 
Housing production is determined by a constant elasticity of scale (CES) production 
function that uses land and physical capital as inputs. The homogenous good is produced   5
in both the city and rural region by a perfectly competitive skilled sector that uses human 
capital in addition to physical capital and land. The product is traded freely between 
regions without any transportation costs, therefore, its price is normalized to unity and 
wages are equated to the marginal product of labor.  
In order to join the skilled labor pool, workers are required to invest in human capital by 
incurring a fixed cost of education, h. If they choose not to invest in human capital they 
obtain their reservation or unskilled wage, , nr w , which is constant across households and 
time. Skilled workers have the option to migrate to the city by incurring an additional 
fixed cost, c. Further, we assume that unskilled workers are immobile. 
Physical capital is perfectly mobile so that individuals and firms have access to 
international capital markets where the world interest rate, r,  is assumed to be constant 
over time. Household credit constraints arise from costly monitoring of borrowers by 
lenders, thereby making the interest rate for individual borrowers, i, higher than r. Since 
each of the two periods in an agent’s lifetime cover a span of perhaps 20-30 years, the 
interest rate i, and rate of return, r would have the units of  “percent per generation” and 
may well exceed unity (Becker and Tomes, 1979). Due to the presence of such credit 
constraints and fixed costs of human capital and migration, households that differ in the 
amount of received bequests will differ in their choices.  
 
Household Preferences 
Since we are concerned with the impact of rural-to-urban migration on the source region, 
we only consider allocation decisions made by rural households. Urban households are 
assumed to have already settled into their steady states and therefore there is no mobility 
between workers in the skilled and unskilled sectors in the city. Yet, the level of urban 
welfare will change when migration from the rural region occurs.  
There are two periods in a household’s lifetime. In the first period, a household of 
generation t inherits an amount  , it b  and chooses whether to devote their time to education 
or instead work in the unskilled sector. If the household chooses to invest in human 
capital they also decide whether to stay in the rural region or migrate to the city.  In the 
second period all households work, receive wages, and allocate wealth,  , it x , between 
housing, the product, and bequests to their children.  For simplicity, following Galor and 
Zeira (1993), consumption only occurs in the second period.  
The utility function of household i of generation t is 
,,, , 1 log( ) log( ) (1 )log( ) it it it it Ucl b α βα β + =++ − −  
where  , it c ,  , it l  are the consumption levels of the homogenous good and housing 
respectively, ,1 it b +  is the bequest given to their child born to generation t+1, and 
0,1 α β ≤< . Household wealth,  , it x  is allocated according to the following optimized 
rules:   6
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where  , jt p  is the price of housing at time t in region j=r,u (r=rural, u=urban). Their 
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Production Technology of the Homogenous Consumption Good 
Following Henderson and Wang (2005), the model allows for knowledge spillovers in 
production in both the rural and urban region. However, a key difference in city 
production is the existence of an agglomeration component, which is represented by a 
population term in Henderson and Wang’s urban production function.  The population in 
the city is assumed to be above a critical mass required to generate urbanization 
economies, whereas the population in the rural region is not yet at the mark.  
The production function in the rural and urban goods sectors, ,
g
rt Y  and  ,
g
ut Y , at time t are  
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() ()
1
,, , , ,,
1






rt rt ut rt rt rt
gg g
ut rt ut ut ut ut
YH HH NK
Yn HH H N K
εγ ε δ ηγ






, rt H , ,
g
rt N , ,
g
rt K , and  , ut H , ,
g
ut N , ,
g
ut K  are the aggregate stocks of human capital, land, and 
physical capital in the goods sector of the rural region and city respectively.. Knowledge 
capital in each region is determined by the interaction among all skilled workers in both 
regions, but the intensity of these interactions, denoted by  (0 1) η η ≤ ≤ varies with the 
spatial distribution of these workers. (Fujita and Thisse, 2002).  , , ru δ δγ ,ε  are between 0 
and 1. n is the population in the city and σ <1 is the agglomeration parameter. Rural and 
urban wages are given by 
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Dispersive Forces and Housing Production Technology   7
There are different ways to incorporate dispersive forces into a model with Marshallian 
externalities. For example, Fujita and Thisse (2002) include the population and 
population density of the region in the household’s indirect utility function.  The 
population of a region  is assumed to act as a centripetal force that attracts workers,  
whereas the population density, a centrifugal force, has a negative impact on indirect 
utility due to crowding out effects arising from higher pollution and crime rates etc.  
 Elhanan Helpman (1998), instead, invokes the scarcity of  land, which is divided 
equally among residents, as a centrifugal force. An influx of migrants into the region 
lowers the welfare by reducing the share of land available to each resident.  
In this model, higher housing prices serve as a ‘push’ factor. The production of 
housing,  ,
h
jt Y ,is given by the following CES function  
( ) ( )
1/
,, , (( 1 ) )
hh h
jt jt jt YA K N
φφ φ θθ =+ −  
where ,
h
jt K and ,
h
jt N are the regional stocks of physical capital and land used in 
construction. We assume the total amount of available land,  j N , in the city and rural 
region are fixed and divided between goods and housing production. 
Therefore ,,
hg
jt j jt NN N =−. Further, we assume that the quantity of land in the city is 
roughly one-tenth of that in its rural fringe. 
The price of housing is then derived by equating aggregate housing demand by 
households  to aggregate housing supply in the rural and urban regions respectively. 
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where  , jt X  is the aggregate wealth of residents in region j=r,u.  
φ  is the CES parameter and is equal to s/s-1, where s is the elasticity of substitution 
between land and physical capital. In the city, where land is scare, the sensitivity of 
housing prices to an influx of population will depend on the CES parameter. Indeed, 
housing prices will rise with in-migration. However the strong upward pressure on urban 




Labor supply is determined through a discontinuous optimization process. Since 
households are heterogeneous in terms of their inheritance, their occupational and 
locational decisions will vary according to the bequest they receive. As mentioned above, 
if they choose to work as skilled labor, they must incur a fixed cost of investment in 
human capital, h, and an additional fixed migration cost, c, if they choose to migrate as 
well.    8
Households compare their indirect utilities from different options and choose the course 
of action that derives the greatest utility. If a household chooses to work as a low-skilled 
worker, their first period wealth is ,, () ( 1 ) nr it wb r + + , and their second period earnings is 
















If an household chooses to borrow funds to supplement their bequest for investing in 
human capital, then their first period debt is  , () ( 1 ) it hb i − + , where i is the borrowers 
interest rate (i>r), and their second period earnings are  , rt w . Their total lifetime utility 















Likewise the utility of a household who can afford to invest in human capital without 















The utility of an household who chooses to borrow to invest in human capital and migrate 















and those who find it preferable to invest in human capital and migrate without having to 















Household decisions differ because of the wedge between the borrowers interest rate, i, 
and the rate of return on wealth, r. As stated above, choices will depend on their 
inheritance, , it b .  
 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium skilled wages, housing prices and factor quantities are simultaneously 
determined each generation under full employment of workers and factors. Households are 
assumed to have perfect foresight, implying that their decision to invest in human capital or 
migrate in the first period of their lives will be consistent with wage and price realizations 
in the second period. Equations (1) and (2) satisfy labor market equilibrium conditions   9
when  , rt H and , ut H  are the aggregate stocks of human capital derived from household 
utility maximization. Equations (3) and (4) satisfy housing demand and supply conditions 
in both regions.  
The quantities of physical capital employed in the goods and housing sectors in the city 
are determined by equating the marginal product of physical capital to the global interest 
rate, r.  
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We assume that physical capital is more expensive to acquire in the rural region due to 
informational constraints in conjunction with a higher level of risk in thinner rural 
markets. In this case, rural marginal products are equated to r ξ + , where  0 ξ > . 
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Finally, land factors prices are equalized across the goods and housing sectors in the rural 
and urban regions respectively: 
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These ten equations characterize regional equilibrium conditions for each generation, t.  
 
When does migration take place? 
Prevailing wage and price conditions determine whether skilled workers migrate. When 
real urban wages aren’t high enough to cause a complete brain drain in the rural region, 
rural-urban migrants include workers from the two cohorts of the wealth distribution. At 
the upper end of the distribution , inheritors of bequests greater than the cost of 
education, h, may find it cheaper to migrate, regardless of whether they need to borrow or 
not. At the other end of the wealth spectrum, a portion of the poorest workers who have 
bequest levels less than h, may choose to incur debt to migrate to the city. The real value 
of their liabilities is drawn down by higher housing prices in the city, and is more than 
compensated for by higher urban wages. In contrast, middle-income rural residents will   10
derive greater welfare surpluses if they choose not to incur the cost of migration which 
their richer neighbors can afford to do. They are better off taking advantage of lower rural 
housing prices since their initial liabilities are not as great as some of their poorer 
neighbors.  
Richer rural residents, with bequests higher than h will choose to migrate if the following 
condition is satisfied 
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This inequality implies that the opportunity cost of migration for savers is less than the 
gains from migration. The left hand side is the sum of real rural wages plus the returns 
from not incurring the cost of migration and instead investing it in savings. The right 
hand side is real urban wages. Note that this inequality only presents the opportunity cost 
for rural residents with bequests above h, and does not imply that some less wealthier 
households will migrate as well. In that case, if the following condition is satisfied, 
households with bequests less than h choose to migrate. 
       
,, ,
,, , ,
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ut ut rt nr
rt ut ut rt
wci wciw whr
pp p p
ββ β β π
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −+ −+ ++
−<− ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠















.  The left hand side of the inequality is the relative 
gains of choosing the unskilled sector over migration to the city. The right hand side is 
the relative gains of migration over choosing the skilled rural sector. As long as the 
relative benefits of unskilled wages are smaller than the premium from migration, some 
workers with bequests less than h will choose to migrate.  
When does a brain drain occur?  
The section above described the conditions under which migration may occur, though not 
all skilled residents will migrate under those conditions. A widespread brain drain occurs 
only under the following condition 
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The left hand side of this condition is the cost of migration, which includes the 
opportunity cost of foregone rural wages and the real financial cost of migration for 
borrowers (i.e., the difference between equations A and C is that A uses r or the returns 
from savings, while (C) uses i). If the sum of these components, i.e. the total cost of 
migration, is less than real urban wages, then everyone who finds it profitable to invest in 
human capital will find it profitable to invest in human capital and migrate, borrowers 
and savers alike. Note that in this case, regardless of their bequest levels, all skilled rural 
residents will choose to migrate.  
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When is a brain drain averted? 
Migration ceases or does not take place when conditions (A) and (B) are reversed. This 
implies that residents who received bequests more as well as less than h will not find it 
profitable to migrate. Poorer households, in this case benefit more from either settling for 
the unskilled wage or investing in education to the join the rural skilled sector. Regional 
real wage differentials aren’t high enough to induce richer rural residents to migrate 
either. 
Bequest thresholds 
For each of the above cases, we calculate threshold levels of bequests at which 
households are indifferent between two choices. Table 1 shows the ranges of bequests for 
each type of household decision when conditions (A) and (B) hold, i.e. when some 
migration takes place. Table 2 shows bequest ranges when condition (C) holds, i.e. when 
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Bequest  intervals when some migration takes place 
(A) and (B) hold.  
Household Decision 
, it b< () ,, , ,
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h≤ , it b < ,, , ,
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  Invest in human capital and stay in the rural region without having to 
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h+c≤  , it b< ,, , ,
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Bequest intervals when a brain drain occurs 
(C) holds.  
Household Decision 
() ,, , , ,
,,
1
() ( 1 )
(1 ) (1 )
it n r ut rt ut rt
rt ut
bo w p h c i p w p
ip rp
ββ β
ββ <= + + + −
+− +
  Work as unskilled labor in the rural region 
, it ob hc ≤< +   Borrow to invest in human capital and migrate to the city 




Bequest intervals when a brain drain is averted 
(A) and (B) do not hold.  
Household Decision 
, it b< ,, ,
1
[( 2)( 1 ) ] nr srt fw r h i w
ir
=+ + + −
−
  Work as unskilled labor in the rural region 
f ≤ , it b<  h   Borrow to invest in human capital and migrate to the city 
, it b ≥h+c  Invest in human capital and migrate to the city without having to 
borrow 
Table 3 
   14
Dynamics of Bequests 
 The optimal allocation of wealth towards bequests was derived above as 










































m, l and k are stable steady states, while g is an unstable steady state. For example, if the 
initial bequest level falls below m, the amount of transfers passed down from generation 
to generation will increase until it eventually converges to m, while transfers received by 
children with forefathers who had bequest levels above m but below g will decrease until 
it too converges to m. 
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The solid black line represents those who choose to stay in the rural region. The dotted 
black line represents those who choose to migrate while the dotted grey line above it 
shows the dynamics of bequests from children whose forefathers migrated to the city. 
Amenity driven migration is not considered in this model, therefore, it is assumed that 
once families migrate to the city they do not return to the rural region. Therefore, k, the 
steady state of the descendants of rural-urban migrants is calculated by equating 
, (1 )[ ( (1 )] ut bw b h r αβ =−− + − + . If migration ceases, rural families with bequests 
above g will eventually settle into the stable steady state, l, which is the intersection of 
the solid grey line with the 45-degree axis. 
The position of the steady states depend on skilled wages and housing prices, which are 
in turn determined by the parameters of the model. In the next section we present results 
from simulations of the equilibrium system under different policy regimes and discuss the 
fundamentals that drive the various welfare outcomes.  
 
Simulation of the model 
Wage and price outcomes are the result of complex interactions between the various 
parameters of the model. The magnitude and direction of the change in welfare under a 
particular policy regime will depend on the configuration of these parameters and the 
initial distribution of wealth. In order to demonstrate that the same policy may have 
dramatically different welfare implications depending on the characteristics of the region 
in which they’re applied, we simulate the model under different values for  u δ , the 
knowledge spillovers component in the urban goods production function, and ϕ , the CES 
parameter in the housing production function under four policy regimes.
1 For each of 
these cases, all other parameters are kept constant.
  
In the first regime no policy is implemented. In the second regime, an education subsidy 
is granted to all households of the initial generation with bequests less than the fixed cost 
of education, h. Revenues to fund the subsidy program are raised by taxing urban 
residents so that total taxes equal total subsidies. This would be an example of a person-
based policy with direct place-based implications since urban taxpayers fund the 
program. For the third and fourth regimes, we assume that the same amount of funds 
                                                 
1 Note that the rural region and the city have the same housing technology.   16
raised for the subsidy program can instead be invested to increase firm productivity. In 
the third regime the funds support an increase of 0.01 over the baseline parameter value 
for  r δ =0.07, the knowledge spillovers parameter in the rural production function, while 
in the fourth regime they support an increase of 0.02. These are examples of place-based 
policies that improve the economic vitality of the region without specifically targeting 
individual households. 
The model was simulated in Matlab using Newton-Raphson root-finding routines to solve 
the nonlinear system of equilibrium equations for each generation.  A representative 
normal distribution of wealth was created for the rural region with a mean lower than the 
cost of education and a standard deviation twice the mean. The distribution was updated 
every generation to reflect bequests from parents who chose to stay in the rural region 
and those who migrated. For the base-line parametrization of the model , we calibrated 
the system to reflect realistic estimates for various parameters.  0.1 u δ = , 0.07 r δ = , and 
0.06 σ = are within the range of estimated parameter values in the economic geography 
literature for knowledge spillovers and agglomeration effects  (Rosenthal and Strange, 
2002; Ciccone and Hall,1996). 
2  
 
Knowledge Spillovers Parameter in City Goods Production, u δ  
The baseline value for  u δ  is 0.1. We vary  u δ from 0.09 to 0.125 in increments of 0.001. 
For the second regime, the root finding routine was unable to satisfactorily converge to a 
solution for values of  u δ  greater than 0.114. We are therefore restricted to a range of 0.09 
to 0.114 for the person-based policy regime. 
 As shown in figure 2a, migration takes place when there are greater positive externalities 
u δ  in the city. However, the volume of migration varies considerably under the four 
regimes. As mentioned above, lower-wealth households have more incentives to migrate 
than medium-wealth households. In regimes 1, 3, and 4, i.e. the regime with no policy, 
and the two placed-based policy regimes, migration  mostly comprises of poorer 
households with bequest levels below h . When these households receive a subsidy, most 
of them no longer need to migrate to the city to derive higher utility, and so, like their 
medium-wealth neighbors, choose to stay in the rural region.  
Since the volume of migration is lower in the person-based policy regime, rural wages do 
not vary as much. Conversely, the other three regimes witness a rise in rural wages, as 
greater rural out-migration leads to higher rural wages for the remaining workers. 
Housing prices also decrease in these three regimes as aggregate housing demand falls 
with an outflow of population (Figures 2d and 2e).  
 
                                                 
2 Other baseline parameter values are r=0.35,i=3, 0.75, 0.15, 0.2, 0.4, 0.7. γ εα β θ = == = = The initial 
population in the rural region is 350,000 and  500,000 in the city. Land acreage in the urban region is 
1,300,000 hectares, and 200,000 hectares in the city. The greater population density in the city causes the 
agglomeration effects.   17
Interestingly, housing prices increase under the education subsidy program.This may 
seem counterintuitive but it illustrates the unapparent and possible unintended 
consequences of the subsidy.  Under the person-based policy regime, when a small 
number of rural residents migrate, the human capital stock in rural production goes down, 
which reduces returns to other complementary factors. In particular, a lower marginal 
product of land implies that less land is desirable in goods production. However, lower 
returns to land in goods production imply lower opportunity costs of employing land in 
housing construction. Additionally, under the assumption of full employment of factors 
and fixed amounts of land in each region, a decline in the utilization of land in one sector 
means an increase in the other. The upward pressure on housing prices from employing 
more of the scarce factor in housing production outweighs the downward pressure from 
the reduction in housing demand as people migrate. To be sure, if the volume of 
migration were larger, the corresponding reduction in the demand for housing would 
eventually drive the price down, as in the other three regimes. 
What do the different policy regimes imply for long-run welfare outcomes in the rural 
region? Under the subsidy program, all rural residents are employed as skilled workers. 
Due to diminishing returns, wages are comparatively lower than those in the other policy 
regimes. The person-based policy regime therefore reduces income inequality and 
eliminates the threat of falling into a poverty trap by bolstering participants with 
additional wealth. However, if the subsidies were unable to cover all poor households in 
the rural region, households left behind would have fared much better if the program 
were never implemented. When wages decrease as a result of the heightened competition 
in the labor force, the minimum level of bequests, g,  for escaping the poverty trap 
increases (Figure 2h). This means that poorer rural households not covered by the 
program find it more difficult to overcome that threshold and escape poverty. Policy 
makers must be careful to ensure that the poorest members of society are not left to bear 
the brunt of these unintended effects.  
On the other hand, in regime 3, when the rural human-capital spillover  r δ is increased to 
0.08, wages are higher than in the person-based policy regime. However, as shown in 
figure 2b, for lower values of  u δ , not all rural residents find it profitable to become 
skilled workers, and their families eventually fall into a poverty trap. In contrast, if the 
revenues generated from taxing urban residents are able to fund an increase in 
productivity to  r δ =0.09,  all rural residents are able to escape poverty for all values of 
u δ .  Real rural wages are highest in this policy regime.  
Even though regional wage differentials are highest in the second regime, the subsidy 
program blunts incentives for some participants to migrate. Without the education 
subsidy, poorer rural residents would have migrated to the city if real urban wages were 
high enough to compensate for the costs of migration. Figures 2i and 2j show that long-
run average welfare for migrants is higher than that for the remaining rural households, 
suggesting that poorer households would have been better in the long-term if the 
education subsidy had not discouraged their migration. Rebecca Blank suggests that in 
situations where economic restructuring has permanently lowered long-term employment 
opportunities in the region, one may want to instead structure assistance programs to 
encourage geographic mobility (Blank, 2005).   18
Constant Elasticity of Substitution Parameter in Housing Production, φ  
We vary φ  from -0.7 to -0.2, which correspond to elasticities of substitution in the range 
of 0.58 and 0.83. When elasticities are higher, capital can be more easily substituted for 
land. As φ  increases, the greater substitutability implies that housing prices fall in both 
regions.  
Figure 3a shows that the person-based policy actually facilitates migration for greater 
elasticities. In the first regime migration occurs only for values of φ  greater than  -0.2  . 
Migration  under the subsidy program starts to take place when φ  is only -0.3 or when 
the elasticity of substitution is 0.77. When education is subsidized by taxing urban 
residents, housing demand falls which reduces city prices, further increasing wage 
differentials. Therefore, for the same values of φ , urban housing is cheaper in the person-
based policy regime spurring greater rural-urban migration. Under the-place based policy 
regimes, higher real rural wages lower regional wage differentials, completely stemming 
migration for all values of φ  (Figure 3c). However, when  r δ =0.08, not all rural residents 
are able to escape a poverty trap. Some households remain unskilled in the long-run as 
seen in figure 3b. 
Figures 3d and 3f illustrate that urban housing prices vary much more dramatically with 
higher elasticities of substitution than rural housing prices. Because land is more scarce in 
the city, housing prices are more sensitive to changes in the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and land, whereas in the rural region the abundance of land implies that 
greater flexibility in using land has a smaller impact. 
Even though more migration is induced under the subsidy program than under the other 
regimes, it is still not enough to prevent a modest increase in housing prices. As 
discussed above, if upward pressure on housing prices by using more land is not 
exceeded by an aggregate reduction in housing demand, housing prices will still increase 
slightly as migration occurs. Migration on the order of 10% of the rural population, which 
also happens to comprise of some of the poorest residents of the region, is not enough to 
considerably alter housing demand.  
In terms of long-run welfare outcomes, poorer families under the subsidy program fare 
quite well for higher values of φ . Households who initially migrated in the first 
generation eventually settle into a high welfare steady state. Without the subsidies, these 
households would not have been able to migrate and would have had to settle for lower 
long-run welfare, with some of the poorest falling into a poverty trap. Even in contrast to 
the place-based regimes where all residents remain  due to relatively higher real rural 
wages, poorer households who are able to migrate when education is subsidized do much 
better (Figures 3i and 3j). However, wealthier rural residents in the person-based policy 
regime would have to settle for lower real wages due to the enhanced competition from 
the larger skilled labor pool. 
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Conclusion 
This paper extends the literature on poverty traps and regional economics by 
incorporating rural-urban migration, human capital externalities, and regional 
agglomeration effects into Galor and Zeira’s (1993) overlapping generations model to 
examine the welfare impacts of various rural poverty alleviating strategies. We simulate 
the model to demonstrate how regions with different production and housing 
technologies may respond differently to a given policy. In particular, we were interested 
in the effects of various person-based versus place-based policies and their effects on 
welfare and on whether they induce a rural brain drain.  
Our results show that for certain cases, well intended policies targeting poor households 
may instead worsen their long-run welfare outcomes if households prefer not to migrate 
to the wealthier urban region when awarded a subsidy. Indeed, person-based policies 
reduce income inequality, but may precipitate poorer families towards a poverty trap if 
program costs are too high to cover all of them. Place-based policies that do not target 
individuals , but instead, improve the productivity of rural firms, have the potential to 
increase average rural welfare. However, the benefits of such policies may not trickle 
down to the least disadvantaged. In other cases, person-based policies are shown to 
improve the long-run welfare of poorer households by facilitating migration to the city. 
Place-based policies actually hinder migration, but if productivity hikes are substantial 
they may reduce the likelihood of falling into a poverty trap while increasing real rural 
wages. Our model provides a formal framework that addresses the fundamentals that may 
drive these contrasting welfare responses and in better understanding when place or 
people-based policies are relatively more appropriate. 
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Regional responses to various policy regimes under different values of  u δ  
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Regional responses to various policy regimes under different values of φ  
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